

Appendix for “The Choice among Aid Donors: The Effects of Multilateral vs. Bilateral Aid on Recipient Behavioral Support”

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20 February 2016

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Sampling Details

Table A1: Party Breakdown of Sampled Constituencies and Parliamentary Breakdown (2012)

| Party | Sampled Constituencies | | Parliamentary Distribution | |
|------------------------------|------------------------|---------|----------------------------|---------|
| | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| Conservative Party | 1 | 1.82 | 1 | 0.43 |
| Democratic Party | 3 | 5.45 | 11 | 4.72 |
| Forum for Democratic Change | 7 | 12.73 | 23 | 9.87 |
| Independent | 4 | 7.27 | 29 | 12.45 |
| Justice Forum | 1 | 1.82 | 1 | 0.43 |
| National Resistance Movement | 37 | 67.27 | 162 | 69.53 |
| Uganda People's Congress | 2 | 3.64 | 6 | 2.58 |
| Total | 55 | 100 | 233 | 100 |

Electricity Condition

“The Electricity Sector Development Project will improve the reliability of and increase access to electricity. One major aspect of the project is to extend electricity to those who do not yet have access to it. The project may require your community to provide funding for maintenance in the future. [This project will be funded by the RANDOMLY ASSIGNED FUNDER]. How much would you support this project?”

Refining the Analysis to Familiarity with Donors

We considered only the subjects who were familiar with the four named donors: the U.S. government, the Chinese government, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank.

Table A2: Citizen Preferences for Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid For those Who Know Donor.

| Panel A: Subjects who know donors | | | | | | | |
|--|----------------|---------|-----------------|---------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Strong Support | Tell | Willing to sign | Signed | Willing to SMS | Sent SMS | Aid Support |
| Bilateral | 0.80 | 0.94 | 0.83 | 0.81 | 0.68 | 0.06 | 4.09 |
| N | 839 | 829 | 839 | 839 | 841 | 321 | 841 |
| Multilateral | 0.81 | 0.95 | 0.88 | 0.85 | 0.71 | 0.06 | 4.24 |
| N | 553 | 549 | 553 | 554 | 554 | 248 | 554 |
| Difference | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.04** | 0.04** | 0.03 | -0.00 | 0.16** |
| Panel B: 2SLS (Instrument: Assignment to Treat / Know donor; Instrumented: Perceptions in manipulation check) | | | | | | | |
| | Strong Support | Tell | Willing to sign | Signed | Willing to SMS | Sent SMS | Aid Support |
| Bilateral | 0.004 | -0.018 | -0.043* | -0.044* | -0.016 | -0.000 | -0.142 |
| Std. Error. | (0.028) | (0.015) | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.033) | (0.025) | (0.096) |
| N | 1240 | 1231 | 1240 | 1243 | 1243 | 532 | 1243 |

Note: Two-tailed tests of significance: * 0.10; ** 0.05.

In this subset of subjects familiar with donors, citizens were significantly more likely to express willingness to sign the petition in the multilateral condition compared to bilateral (87.5 percent vs. 83.4, $t=2.15$). This was also the case with subjects actually signing the petition: 85.2 percent in the multilateral condition actually signed vs. 80.9 percent for bilateral ($t=2.14$).¹ In both cases the substantive difference of 4 percent appears modest and may reflect ceiling effects for highly valued projects. Using the overall aid support variable, we get stronger results. In the last column of Table A2, there is a significant preference among the masses for multilateral aid.

However, it is important to note here that citizen familiarity with aid providers differed significantly across the donors. These differences did not occur at random, making this analysis susceptible to selection bias. The question about donor familiarity came after the treatment assignment, and the prompt did indeed seem to make subjects more likely to answer affirmatively that they had heard of the

¹ Looking at the raw averages along a scale of support, they were more willing to express support for projects by multilateral donors than bilaterals (3.68 vs. 3.60, $p = 0.086$).

organization. This stands to reason, since subjects had just been prompted in the treatment with the name of the organization. Nevertheless, the treatment effects of assignment to a particular donor boosted familiarity with that donor by roughly the same degree both substantively – in percentage points – and at similar levels of statistical significance across the donors. This was true for the World Bank, African Development Bank, and USAID. The level of familiarity with China was drawn from a different question that occurred before treatment assignment. So this caveat holds for the other three donors but could not be systematically tested for China. Thus, while differential familiarity with the various donors apparently altered the proportions of subjects familiar with those donors, random assignment to given donors does not appear to have caused significant variation in the proportion of subjects reporting familiarity across the donors. Thus, selection into the category of “familiar with Donor X” appears to be unbiased across treatment conditions. In other words, the differences in differences are null. This should lend greater credibility to the analysis of the treatment effects for subjects familiar with the various donors. The same is true of familiarity with donors and the probability of attitudinal and behavioral support for the projects across donors. While subjects more familiar with the various donors were indeed more likely to support the given projects, they were not significantly more likely to avow or show that support differently across donors. Again, the differences in differences across donors are null. Again, while this does not entirely dismiss the possibility of selection bias, it does alleviate concerns that the few treatment effects we see for subjects familiar with the given donors are not being driven by prior treatment effects on selection or by the different propensity toward support associated with differential familiarity with the various donors.

Not all subjects passed a manipulation check about which donor appeared in the prompts, leading us to refine the results beyond basic intention-to-treat. Manipulation checks for the masses show that subjects recalled the type of project and the type of donor in most cases (89% for project and 63% for donor). We did not ask the MPs these questions out of deference for their position so we cannot look at this subgroup. In other words, if some subjects do not understand the manipulation then we can treat this as a compliance problem, which is solved through an instrumental variable approach and estimated 2 stage least squares regression analysis. See Gerber and Green 2012. Table A2, Panel B, displays the results of a complier average causal effect analysis in which assignment to treatment served as an instrument for accurate perceptions in the manipulation check, which in turn predicts levels of support. The results of this analysis are similar to the results reported in Panel A of Table A2 for subjects who knew of the donors, although the level of statistical significance attenuates from 0.05 to 0.1. Thus we see some pattern whereby the public is a bit more supportive of multilateral aid and the MPs are more supportive of bilateral aid.

Additional Results on Mechanisms

Table A3: Mass Support and Aid Politicization.

| Mass Support Conditional on Perceptions of Politicization | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|------|-----------------|--------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Strong Support | Tell | Willing to sign | Signed | Willing to SMS | Sent SMS | Aid Support |
| Aid helps the neediest people | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.78 | 0.92 | 0.82 | 0.80 | 0.66 | 0.05 | 4.00 |
| N | 607 | 597 | 607 | 608 | 608 | 222 | 608 |
| Multilateral | 0.76 | 0.92 | 0.83 | 0.79 | 0.64 | 0.03 | 3.96 |
| N | 571 | 563 | 571 | 573 | 573 | 213 | 573 |
| Difference | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.05 |
| Aid helps friends of donor | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.78 | 0.95 | 0.85 | 0.82 | 0.65 | 0.06 | 4.08 |
| N | 798 | 792 | 798 | 801 | 801 | 333 | 801 |
| Multilateral | 0.77 | 0.96 | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.63 | 0.05 | 4.04 |
| N | 785 | 780 | 785 | 788 | 788 | 299 | 788 |
| Difference | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.03 | -0.00 | -0.04 |

Note: A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the bilateral condition is larger than the proportion under the multilateral condition, implying the bilateral condition is preferred to the multilateral one. A positive difference implies that the multilateral condition is preferred to the bilateral condition. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column). The higher Ns for willingness to SMS in the fifth column are a result of subject refusals to answer the petition questions. That is, if a subject refused to answer petition questions, we still asked about SMS and fewer subjects declined to answer SMS questions. Also, the Ns may decrease in the "Sent SMS" condition (relative to "Willing to SMS") because we only calculate Sent SMS for subjects who owned a phone.

Table A4: Mass Support and Aid Conditionality.

| Mass Support Conditional on Perceptions of Conditionality | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|------|-----------------|--------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Strong Support | Tell | Willing to sign | Signed | Willing to SMS | Sent SMS | Aid Support |
| Conditions on aid hurt Uganda | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.72 | 0.93 | 0.80 | 0.78 | 0.65 | 0.04 | 3.89 |
| N | 638 | 627 | 638 | 639 | 639 | 265 | 639 |
| Multilateral | 0.75 | 0.93 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.64 | 0.05 | 3.96 |
| N | 623 | 616 | 623 | 624 | 624 | 247 | 624 |
| Difference | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.07 |
| Conditions on aid help Uganda | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.83 | 0.96 | 0.88 | 0.85 | 0.67 | 0.07 | 4.22 |
| N | 674 | 671 | 674 | 677 | 677 | 240 | 677 |
| Multilateral | 0.80 | 0.96 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.63 | 0.04 | 4.09 |
| N | 679 | 675 | 679 | 681 | 681 | 232 | 681 |
| Difference | -0.04* | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.12* |

Note: A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the bilateral condition is larger than the proportion under the multilateral condition, implying the bilateral condition is preferred to the multilateral one. A positive difference implies that the multilateral condition is preferred to the bilateral condition. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column). The higher Ns for willingness to SMS in the fifth column are a result of subject refusals to answer the petition questions. That is, if a subject refused to answer petition questions, we still asked about SMS and fewer subjects declined to answer SMS questions. Also, the Ns may decrease in the “Sent SMS” condition (relative to “Willing to SMS”) because we only calculate Sent SMS for subjects who owned a phone.

Table A5: Mass Support and Aid Transparency.

| Mass Support Conditional on Perceptions of Transparency | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|-------|-----------------|--------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Strong Support | Tell | Willing to sign | Signed | Willing to SMS | Sent SMS | Aid Support |
| Bilateral aid more transparent than multilateral aid | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.83 | 0.95 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.69 | 0.06 | 4.17 |
| N | 487 | 485 | 488 | 490 | 490 | 195 | 490 |
| Multilateral | 0.82 | 0.94 | 0.84 | 0.83 | 0.67 | 0.03 | 4.11 |
| N | 468 | 465 | 468 | 470 | 470 | 168 | 470 |
| Difference | -0.01 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.06 |
| Multilateral aid more transparent than bilateral aid | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.77 | 0.94 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.63 | 0.04 | 4.00 |
| N | 821 | 810 | 821 | 822 | 822 | 323 | 822 |
| Multilateral | 0.76 | 0.94 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.61 | 0.06 | 3.96 |
| N | 800 | 791 | 800 | 803 | 803 | 320 | 803 |
| Difference | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.04 |

Note: A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the bilateral condition is larger than the proportion under the multilateral condition, implying the bilateral condition is preferred to the multilateral one. A positive difference implies that the multilateral condition is preferred to the bilateral condition. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column). The higher Ns for willingness to SMS in the fifth column are a result of subject refusals to answer the petition questions. That is, if a subject refused to answer petition questions, we still asked about SMS and fewer subjects declined to answer SMS questions. Also, the Ns may decrease in the “Sent SMS” condition (relative to “Willing to SMS”) because we only calculate Sent SMS for subjects who owned a phone.

Table A6: Mass Support and Aid Efficacy.

| Mass Support Conditional on Perceptions of Efficacy | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|-------|-----------------|--------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Strong Support | Tell | Willing to sign | Signed | Willing to SMS | Sent SMS | Aid Support |
| Bilateral aid more effective than multilateral aid | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.84 | 0.95 | 0.86 | 0.84 | 0.71 | 0.06 | 4.23 |
| N | 498 | 497 | 498 | 501 | 501 | 196 | 501 |
| Multilateral | 0.83 | 0.94 | 0.86 | 0.84 | 0.67 | 0.02 | 4.14 |
| N | 437 | 431 | 437 | 438 | 438 | 165 | 438 |
| Difference | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.04 | -0.04* | -0.09 |
| Multilateral aid more effective than bilateral aid | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 0.75 | 0.93 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.62 | 0.04 | 3.95 |
| N | 821 | 810 | 822 | 823 | 823 | 312 | 823 |
| Multilateral | 0.75 | 0.95 | 0.83 | 0.81 | 0.62 | 0.06 | 3.98 |
| N | 853 | 847 | 853 | 856 | 856 | 326 | 856 |
| Difference | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.03 |

Note: A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the bilateral condition is larger than the proportion under the multilateral condition, implying the bilateral condition is preferred to the multilateral one. A positive difference implies that the multilateral condition is preferred to the bilateral condition. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column). The higher Ns for willingness to SMS in the fifth column are a result of subject refusals to answer the petition questions. That is, if a subject refused to answer petition questions, we still asked about SMS and fewer subjects declined to answer SMS questions. Also, the Ns may decrease in the "Sent SMS" condition (relative to "Willing to SMS") because we only calculate Sent SMS for subjects who owned a phone.

Randomization Check

Table A7: Randomization Check (Mass Survey)

DV: Multilateral vs. Bilateral

| <i>Donor Treatment</i> | Coef. | Std. Err. |
|------------------------|--------|-----------|
| Education | 0.016 | 0.010 |
| Male | 0.063 | 0.078 |
| Age | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| NRM | 0.075 | 0.080 |
| Christian | -0.453 | 0.581 |
| Muslim | -0.341 | 0.588 |
| Region (East) | -0.051 | 0.118 |
| Region (West) | -0.104 | 0.118 |
| Region (North) | -0.156 | 0.116 |
| Constant | 0.326 | 0.599 |
| Obs. | 2811 | |

Note: *p<0.05

References

Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2012. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton.