

Appendix for “Terrorism and Civil War:  
A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a  
Conceptual Problem”\*

Michael G. Findley  
Department of Political Science  
Brigham Young University  
mikefindley@byu.edu

Joseph K. Young  
School of Public Affairs  
American University  
jyoung@american.edu

April 26, 2012

---

\*We thank Erica Chenoweth, Laura Dugan, Peter Krause, Jim Piazza, Nicholas Sambanis, and Barbara Walter for helpful comments and Jed Dunn, Paul Martin, and Jeff Tanner for valuable research assistance.

## Appendix

Because geographic information could not be identified for a number of terrorist attacks, we also address the missing data problem in three additional ways: (1) excluding missing data altogether; (2) assuming that missing data fall in the conflict zone; and (3) assuming missing data fall outside of the conflict zone. Table 1 displays the raw counts and percentages of terrorist events that fall into each of the three categories, further subdivided by the different measure of civil war.

The data do not appear to be missing in noticeably systematic ways; most countries have amounts of missing data roughly in proportion to their overall terrorism levels relative to other countries. Thus, excluding missing data is our baseline, which is how we record it in the main text. But we report the two additional statistics — assuming all missing observations relate to the conflict vs. none of them relating — which become something of a confidence interval regarding how much terrorism is related to the civil war. Assuming that the missing observations relate to the conflict, the percentage of conflict-related terrorist events is much higher than reported in the paper. And assuming that the missing observations do not relate to the conflict, the percentage of conflict-related events is much lower than reported in the paper.

Table 1: Percentage of War-Related Terrorist Events

<b>Percentage in Conflict Zones (ViewConflicts)</b>			
	Percentage (Drop Missing)	Percentage (Missing in Zone)	Percentage (Missing Out of Zone)
Non-conflict	56.15% (25,848)	37.76% (25,848)	64.98% (44,487)
Conflict	43.85% (20,189)	62.24% (42,612)	35.02% (23,973)
<b>Percentage in Conflict Zones (PRIO/Uppsala)</b>			
	Percentage (Drop Missing)	Percentage (Missing in Zone)	Percentage (Missing Out of Zone)
Non-conflict	43.97% (20,241)	29.57% (20,241)	49.79% (34,088)
Conflict	56.03% (25,796)	70.43% (48,219)	50.21% (34,372)
<b>Percentage in Conflict Zones or Committed by Rebel Group</b>			
	Percentage (ViewConflicts)	PRIO/Uppsala)	
Non-conflict	36.81% (20,439)	31.05% (17,241)	
Conflict	63.19% (35,090)	68.95% (38,288)	

## A Maps with Disaggregated Event Counts




Figure 1: Argentina: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government




Figure 2: Bangladesh: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government








Figure 3: El Salvador: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government




Figure 4: Lebanon: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government






Figure 5: Mozambique: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government




Figure 6: Peru: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government

## **B Maps with Kill Counts Instead of Event Counts**




Figure 7: Argentina: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government




Figure 8: Bangladesh: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government




Figure 9: El Salvador: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government




Figure 10: Lebanon: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government




Figure 11: Mozambique: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government






Figure 12: Peru: Military vs. Non-Military; Government vs. Non-Government