

Online Appendix for “Lootable Resources and Third-Party
Intervention into Civil Wars.”

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A. Coding Rules¹

Our outcome variables, *intervention on any side*, *intervention on the side of the government* and *intervention on the side of the opposition*, are coded based on the “target of intervention” variable in Regan’s dataset (2002). “Target” is originally a nominal variable coding three types of intervention: intervention on the side of the government, on the side of the opposition, and “neutral” interventions. We do not model the latter. A military intervention is defined as the convention-breaking, third-party provision of troops, naval forces, military equipment or aid, intelligence or advisors, air support, or military sanctions on behalf of either a rebel group or government engaged in a civil war (Regan 2000, 5). An economic intervention is the convention-breaking, third-party provision of grants, loans, non-military equipment or expertise, credits, relief from past obligations, or economic sanctions on behalf of a rebel group or government engaged in a civil war (Regan 2000, 5)

Lootable Rebel Resources is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the evidence exists based on 128 case studies that rebels received extensive financing from drugs, minerals, and other contraband. These data are taken from Fearon (2004).

Diamonds/Gems and *Diamonds/Gems/Drugs* are dummy variables, taking a value of 1 if drugs, gems, or diamonds are located within the conflict zone of a country (Lujala 2010).

Rivalry with the civil war country is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the potential intervener is a rival of the civil war country during the period of observation, according to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) criteria.

Rivalry between potential and actual intervener are two dummy variables indicating rivalry between the potential intervener and actual intervener(s) on the side of the government, and on the side of the opposition likewise. The criteria and source of data for rivalry are the same as above.

Alliance with the civil war country is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the potential intervener is allied to the civil war country via a formal defense or neutrality pact, or entente during the period of observation. Alliance data are obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) Alliance Data (Gibler and Sarkees 2004).

Alliance between potential and actual intervener are two dummy variables indicating alliance ties between the potential intervener and actual intervener(s) on the side of the government, and on the side of the opposition likewise. The criteria and source of data for alliance relations are the same as above.

Geographical Contiguity is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the potential intervener and civil war country are geographically land contiguous to one another. Contiguity data are obtained from the COW Contiguity Data (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002).

¹ The explanation for the operationalization details draws heavily from Findley and Teo 2005.

Colonial History is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the potential intervener was previously the colonizer of the civil war country. The data are obtained from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History Data (Hensel 1999).

Major Power status is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the potential intervener is designated by the COW Project as a major power during the period of observation.

Cold War is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the conflict began before 1989.

Same Region is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the potential intervener and civil war country are located in the same region, as defined by the COW Project.

Capability Ratio is the ratio of the potential intervener's Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC; Singer 1987) score to the civil war country's CINC score. The base-10 logarithm transformation is taken. Version 3 of the CINC data is used.

Joint Democracy is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if both the potential intervener and civil war country score 6 or higher on the Polity scale. Regime type data are obtained from the Polity 4 project (Marshall and Jaggers 2004).

Ethnic: Opposition groups are coded as ethnic based on Gurr's Minority At Risk classification (1993). The data are obtained from Regan (2002).

Ideology: Opposition groups are coded by Regan (2002) as being ideological if the conflict revolves around contesting the dominant political or economic ideology.

Fatalities: Data on the levels of fatalities incurred over the course of the civil conflict are obtained from the Uppsalla/PRIO Battle Deaths Data (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The base-10 logarithm transformation is taken.

Refugees: Data on the number of refugees fleeing from the civil war country are obtained from Moore and Shellman's (2004) dataset on forced migration. The base-10 logarithm transformation is taken.

Table 1A: Logit model with all potential interveners included. Observations: M1 N=38,599; M2 N=38,599; M3 N=49,395; M4 N=49,395.

Covariate	M1: Intervention			M2: Intervention		
	(Diamonds/Gems)			(With Drugs)		
Logit	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P
Diamonds/Gems	0.662	0.483	0.000			
Diamonds/Gems/Drugs				0.590	0.213	0.006
Major Power	1.811	0.224	0.000	1.815	0.223	0.000
Colonial History	1.822	0.334	0.000	1.833	0.333	0.000
Cold War	0.531	0.217	0.015	0.529	0.218	0.015
Same Region	1.063	0.206	0.000	1.058	0.205	0.000
Contiguous State	2.121	0.281	0.000	2.134	0.280	0.000
Capability Ratio (Log)	0.845	0.097	0.000	0.836	0.096	0.000
Rivalry	1.290	0.299	0.000	1.287	0.300	0.000
Alliance	0.984	0.250	0.000	0.944	0.247	0.000
Ethnic Conflict	0.706	0.459	0.124	0.739	0.454	0.104
Ideology Conflict	0.329	0.477	0.489	0.382	0.469	0.416
Joint Democracy	-0.670	0.426	0.116	-0.660	0.425	0.121
Constant	-8.164	0.483	0.000	-8.174	0.477	0.000
Covariate	M3: Opposition Intervention			M4: Government Intervention		
	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P
Loot Rebel Financing	0.818	0.310	0.008	0.039	0.289	0.893
Major Power	1.293	0.346	0.000	2.378	0.252	0.000
Colonial History	1.059	0.518	0.041	1.807	0.337	0.000
Cold War	0.742	0.316	0.019	0.367	0.266	0.167
Same Region	1.080	0.313	0.001	0.806	0.260	0.002
Contiguous State	2.752	0.414	0.000	1.717	0.329	0.000
Capability Ratio (Log)	0.778	0.132	0.000	0.668	0.090	0.000
Rivalry	1.970	0.365	0.000	-0.341	0.465	0.463
Ally	0.145	0.325	0.655	1.452	0.280	0.000
Ethnic Conflict	0.662	0.574	0.249	0.547	0.541	0.312
Ideology Conflict	0.086	0.606	0.887	0.708	0.543	0.192
Joint Democracy	-0.421	0.622	0.499	-0.517	0.508	0.309
Constant	-9.183	0.611	0.000	-8.420	0.564	0.000

Table 2A: Logit with politically relevant interveners included. Observations: M1 N=9,742; M2 N=9,742; M3 N=12,537; M4 N=12,537.

Covariate	M1: Intervention			M2: Intervention		
	(Diamonds/Gems)			(With Drugs)		
Logit	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P
Diamonds/Gems	0.677	0.212	0.001			
Diamonds/Gems/Drugs				0.594	0.211	0.005
Major Power	0.472	0.278	0.089	0.489	0.275	0.075
Colonial History	1.312	0.291	0.000	1.317	0.291	0.000
Cold War	0.389	0.211	0.065	0.386	0.211	0.067
Same Region	-0.200	0.237	0.399	-0.194	0.235	0.409
Contiguous State	1.855	0.239	0.000	1.865	0.239	0.000
Capability Ratio (Log)	0.888	0.107	0.000	0.877	0.107	0.000
Rivalry	1.153	0.282	0.000	1.152	0.282	0.000
Alliance	0.827	0.231	0.000	0.784	0.229	0.001
Ethnic Conflict	0.594	0.413	0.150	0.628	0.409	0.125
Ideology Conflict	0.353	0.429	0.410	0.408	0.423	0.335
Joint Democracy	-0.560	0.414	0.177	-0.549	0.415	0.186
Constant	-6.310	0.498	0.000	-6.327	0.494	0.000
Covariate	M3: Opposition Intervention			M4: Government Intervention		
	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P
Loot Rebel Financing	0.811	0.297	0.006	0.027	0.284	0.923
Major Power	0.282	0.405	0.487	1.188	0.343	0.001
Colonial History	0.723	0.452	0.109	1.474	0.308	0.000
Cold War	0.582	0.306	0.057	0.183	0.263	0.486
Same Region	0.068	0.319	0.830	-0.221	0.312	0.479
Contiguous State	2.412	0.364	0.000	1.634	0.287	0.000
Capability Ratio (Log)	0.816	0.145	0.000	0.707	0.102	0.000
Rivalry	1.882	0.355	0.000	-0.316	0.460	0.492
Ally	0.007	0.305	0.981	1.214	0.270	0.000
Ethnic Conflict	0.652	0.549	0.235	0.417	0.529	0.431
Ideology Conflict	0.317	0.573	0.579	0.736	0.525	0.161
Joint Democracy	-0.460	0.618	0.457	-0.366	0.490	0.455
Constant	-7.650	0.623	0.000	-6.790	0.639	0.000

Table 3A: Rare events logit with all potential interveners included. Observations: M1 N=38,599; M2 N=38,599; M3 N= 49,395; M4 N=49,395.

Covariate	M1: Intervention (Diamonds/Gems)			M2: Intervention (With Drugs)		
	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P
Rare Events Logit						
Diamonds/Gems	0.657	0.215	0.002			
Diamonds/Gems/Drugs				0.585	0.213	0.006
Major Power	1.814	0.224	0.000	1.818	0.212	0.000
Colonial History	1.821	0.335	0.000	1.831	0.334	0.000
Cold War	0.521	0.217	0.017	0.518	0.217	0.017
Same Region	1.061	0.205	0.000	1.056	0.205	0.000
Contiguous State	2.113	0.281	0.000	2.125	0.280	0.000
Capability Ratio (Log)	0.838	0.097	0.000	0.829	0.096	0.000
Rivalry	1.290	0.299	0.000	1.287	0.299	0.000
Alliance	0.983	0.250	0.000	0.944	0.247	0.000
Ethnic Conflict	0.657	0.459	0.153	0.689	0.454	0.129
Ideology Conflict	0.282	0.476	0.553	0.333	0.469	0.477
Joint Democracy	-0.601	0.426	0.158	-0.591	0.426	0.165
Constant	-8.068	0.482	0.000	-8.076	0.477	0.000
Covariate	M3: Opposition Intervention			M4: Government Intervention		
	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	P
Rare Events Logit						
Loot Rebel Financing	0.816	0.310	0.008	0.055	0.287	0.849
Major Power	1.311	0.346	0.000	2.372	0.252	0.000
Colonial History	1.091	0.518	0.035	1.815	0.337	0.000
Cold War	0.714	0.316	0.024	0.351	0.266	0.187
Same Region	1.076	0.313	0.001	0.808	0.259	0.002
Contiguous State	2.734	0.414	0.000	1.716	0.329	0.000
Capability Ratio (Log)	0.769	0.132	0.000	0.663	0.090	0.000
Rivalry	1.952	0.365	0.000	-0.277	0.465	0.552
Ally	0.162	0.325	0.618	1.450	0.279	0.000
Ethnic Conflict	0.546	0.574	0.342	0.459	0.541	0.396
Ideology Conflict	-0.170	0.606	0.978	0.618	0.543	0.255
Joint Democracy	-0.267	0.622	0.668	-0.422	0.507	0.405
Constant	-7.218	0.629	0.000	-8.272	0.564	0.000

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