

The Impact of Networks on the Adoption of Tactical Nonviolence¹

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Terrorism, insurgency, guerillas, rebels. Protests, strikes, mass demonstrations, rallies. These terms elicit various visualizations and are rarely used in conjunction with each other. A lot of research addresses the various forms of resistance against the state. However, little of this research considers the choice between tactics. Though each of these labels have received considerable attention in their own right, an understanding of the connected logics of utilizing one tactic over another as part of a broader strategy is missing. Under what conditions will groups rely upon a single tactic? When and why will they change tactics or employ multiple tactics at once? Only by spanning the gaps in understanding across various tactics of resistance can we hope to gain a wider understanding of political resistance by nonstate actors.

With few exceptions, most articles looking at the topic of terrorism, civil war, or nonviolence fail to examine a broader understanding *across* tactics of resistance. Despite new research and data, artificial barriers between the literatures has left a void where a more complete understanding of the tactics and dynamics of resistance can be examined. Of course, it may be argued that the lack of examination across topics is due to a lack of empirical evidence suggesting that the topics *should* be studied together. However, there are numerous examples of actors that have differentially employed violent and nonviolent tactics. The African National Congress (ANC) used both terrorism and nonviolence, and was a primary combatant in a civil war with the South African government. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) simultaneously used both violence and nonviolence throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Dudouet, 2009). The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) variously used violence and nonviolence in the West

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Bank and Lebanon - though not always the same tactic in both locations at the same time (V. Asal, Legault, Szekely, & Wilkenfeld, 2013). The Maoist Party in Nepal used strategically timed violence and nonviolence to gain concessions from the state (Bhattacharya, 2013). Other groups - Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), M-19 - have variously employed violent and nonviolent tactics (Dudouet, 2013).

Why do some nonstate actors use primarily violent or nonviolent strategies? Why do some differentially use both violent and nonviolent tactics as part of broader strategies? What are the factors - both those internal and external to the group - that affect their strategic decisions? Understanding the answers to these questions are important for at least two reasons. First, in large part, current literature fails to consider the various tactical choices looked at here as part of broader strategies. Evidence suggests that there are many groups that use both violence and nonviolence - in turn, we need to better address and understand the factors that lead to these tactical choices. Examining which groups use solely violence or nonviolence, or a combination of the two, or groups that shift from violence to nonviolence (or nonviolence to violence) – examinations of these scenarios can help us better understand which factors impact tactical and strategic decisions. Second, understanding the conditions that affect a group's decision to use violence or nonviolence has immensely important policy implications. With a fuller understanding of the factors that affect tactical decisions, policy responses can be better tailored to limit violence and encourage nonviolence.

In order to appropriately address these questions, a broad and multifaceted approach needs to be taken. In this paper, the approach will look at the network of groups over time in an attempt to explain the spread of tactical variation - namely the differentially employed violent

and nonviolent approaches to political resistance. Other current projects attempt to address these questions by looking at factors internal and external to the group.

Much the popular research area in recent years, networks have become an interesting and oft resorted to method of examining data. There is a strong tradition of looking at networks in the realm of violent groups. Seeing how terrorist networks function, how did Al Qaeda pull off the 9/11 attacks, how does a group's connections make a group more violent? There have been numerous efforts at figuring out what makes these 'dark networks' tick, what makes them resilient, what steps can be taken to combat them. I argue here that networks are also important when it comes to understanding the use of nonviolence.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that by using networks of relationships between groups, we can better understand group behavior. Perhaps in and of itself that is not new or interesting - however, I am proposing that groups, and in particular *violent* groups, will be more likely to use nonviolence as a tactic if members of their network use nonviolence. Furthermore, I argue that even a minimalist definition of what constitutes a "network" is sufficient to realize this impact. Strict evidence of "alliances" or "cooperation" are not necessary - networks based on relationships of awareness and proximity are sufficient for nonviolence to spread.

This paper will proceed by examining some of the primary assumptions and strands of literature which lay the foundation for understanding violent and nonviolent tactics and strategies. This will then be followed by an examination of organizational literature which frames the arguments set forth in this paper. The data and methods used to test these arguments will then presented and followed by a discussion of the results.

Rationality of the Actors

Rationality is most always an important assumption that is made when examining both violent and nonviolent tactics. However, it is particularly important for this project, because the primary argument deals directly with groups rationally choosing violent and/or nonviolent tactics in their efforts against the state. Without the assumption of rationality, the choices made by groups have less meaning and cannot be explored as part of broader strategies. The actors under consideration are assumed to be rational, and are rationally choosing the use of violence or nonviolence, dependent on the factors to be explored in the project.² There is an established precedent in both the nonviolent and violent literatures regarding a group's rationality.

The use of violence as part of a broader strategy is often a deliberate and rational decision. The treatment of rationality in the terrorism literature tends to be more explicit than in the literatures on violence more generally, but the larger implication remains. Violence, such as the tactical use of terrorism, is a rational political choice, a purposeful activity, a clear and deliberate tactic, and those that use terrorism are rational actors choosing the tactic in a strategic effort to achieve a particular goal (Crenshaw 1981; Lake 2002; Pape 2003; 2005; Neumann and Smith 2005; Kydd and Walter 2006; Carson, LaFree, and Dugan 2012; Forest 2012). Terrorists anticipate the reactions of both the government and their constituents and choose their tactics accordingly (Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005, 2008). Furthermore, the innovations of method of attack and changes in targets of attack, suggest that terrorists adapt to their environment in such a way as to provide them the greatest opportunity to realize their objectives (Abdukadirov, 2010; Brandt & Sandler, 2010; Drake, 1998). These are

² Eyerman (1998) explicitly models the decision of a terrorist group to use terrorism or nonviolence, though his findings are limited to conclusions related to regime types.

few of the many examples of terrorists, and violent organizations more generally, being treated by the literature as rational (for a further review, see De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2007, 3–4).

The literature on nonviolence also treats actors as rational, though less explicitly than does the literature on violence. Nonviolence as a tactic refers not to passivity or pacifism, but rather the active use of nonviolent resistance as a tactic in an attempt to achieve some political objective. Nonviolent resistance is defined as "the application of unarmed civil power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013, p. 271)." Nonviolence comes in three primary forms: symbolic protests (vigils, marches), noncooperation (boycotts, labor strikes), and nonviolent intervention (nonviolent occupations or blockades) (Sharp, 1989). Each of these forms in various combinations have been argued to be an effective form of resistance. The effectiveness of nonviolent resistance comes at its most basic from the implicit obedience that states rely on from their population - widespread noncompliance removes this obedience, ultimately contributing to the tactic being effective to some extent (Zunes, 1999).

Nonviolence is a strategic choice. As opposed to the use of nonviolence based on principle, strategic nonviolence situates using the tactic of nonviolence as a choice made by rational actors (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). The actors *chose* to use nonviolence for some reason - perhaps it was expected to be more effective, it is what the group's resources dictated, etc. This decision, however, enables us to think of groups as rational in that based on different variables, the group *chose* nonviolence over using violence, or perhaps over doing nothing at all.

Other authors have theorized along much the same lines - that nonviolence is a strategic decision made by a resistance campaign. Ackerman and Rodal write that "Strategic thinking is

the critical first step (2008, p. 116)", and that "Civil resistance is not about melting hearts but about developing power, and about the artful adaptation of strategy to the complex linkages with other forms and dimensions of power (2008, p. 119)." In other words, the use of nonviolence is very much a tactic aimed at achieving a particular political goal. Using nonviolence is a decision made in consideration of what tactics the campaign or movement expects to be most effective.

The Impact of Networks on Violent Resistance

The literature that addresses the use of violence, and the factors that impact use of violence, is extensive. Often is the case that many of these research agendas and resultant projects study some gathering of violent individuals; but rarely is time taken in especially defining these groups. Violent groups, terrorists, terrorist groups, insurgents, insurgent groups, violent non-state actors, non-state armed groups, etc. – it is uncommon that the research is actually intended to be particular to one form or another. Rather, the moniker used to describe the group is general. For this reason, the following discussion of research combines the primary arguments and findings that pertain to violence and violent tactics, irrespective of the “group” purportedly examined.

Furthermore, the following discussion is organized in a general way by how the arguments relate to the group. Broadly speaking, the arguments can be generally broken down by factors external to the group, internal to the group, or related to group networks. For this project, the focus is on how networks relate to the use of violence.

Networks are currently a particularly popular avenue of approach to the study of violence and violent groups. Generally speaking, how does a group’s connection to other groups or

particular actors impact that group? Connections to other groups will impact the ways that groups behave. Increased connections is argued to lead to an increased group lethality (V. Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Cunningham, 2013) to an increase in suicide attacks (Acosta & Childs, 2013), and to increased support when the ties are transnational (Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011). Groups embedded in group alliance structures and connected to a "globalized world", are more likely to pursue chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (V. H. Asal, Ackerman, & Rethemeyer, 2012). Increased ties to kin outside of a region are demonstrated to make a group more likely to use violence (V. Asal et al., 2013) and make civil war more likely than the use of conventional politics (Cunningham, 2013). While increased connections may be important, Horowitz and Potter (2014) argue that it is *who* a group is connected to that matters most for group lethality. In more general terms, others argue that a connections between groups contribute to the diffusion of conflict and violence (Campana & Ratelle, 2014; Horowitz, 2010; Magouirk, Atran, & Sageman, 2008). One particularly interesting study by Phillips (2012) distinguishes between cooperative and adversarial connections between groups; he finds that the larger the group, the greater the number of adversarial ties the group has (but not cooperative ties). Additionally, he finds that ethnic groups are more likely to have adversarial ties, and religious groups are more likely to have cooperative ties.

The previously cited literature has demonstrated networks are important and can have real and meaningful impact on the violent behavior of groups. We can then use the theoretical and empirical foundations set in these previous studies to also examine how nonviolence – also a tactical and strategic decision – may be affected by networks.

Looking at Strategic Nonviolence

Research that empirically examines nonviolence is scarce relative to the plethora of research looking at violence, however, that has begun to change. New data has allowed the empirical examination of nonviolence as a tactic and has generated more theoretical articles that extend how we understand the use of nonviolence. In what is arguably the first empirical treatment of nonviolence, Douglas Bond writes in reference to nonviolence that "[w]hat is lacking is a basic understanding, grounded in data from actual causes across the diversity of conditions, dynamics, methods and consequences associated with them (1988, p. 81)." Many of these basic questions are still "lacking" today. It was not until 20 years after Bond's article that Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) systematically examined nonviolent campaigns, which helped to spawn the current efforts to better understand the use of nonviolence.

There are reasons that extensive research on nonviolence pales in comparison to violence. In the special issue of the *Journal of Peace Research* on the study of nonviolent resistance, Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) point out three reasons that have contributed to the lack of attention to nonviolence. First, nonviolence is not viewed as pressing as violence. The "hundreds of millions of people killed as a result of political violence" in the 20th century draws more attention than nonviolent efforts do (2013, p. 272). This is understandable and perhaps justifiable, yet this does not diminish the importance of the study of nonviolence if the goal is understanding the dynamics and prosecution of conflict. Second, there are barriers to empirically measuring nonviolence. Underreporting of nonviolent events can be expected to bias efforts of data collection. While this is certainly true, the problem can be mitigated by relying on numerous types of sources. Further, the more recent the timeframe examined the less

underreporting will be an issue due to the increased saturation of media and information available. Third, nonviolence is often equated with 'passive', 'weak', 'pacifist', or 'activist' (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013; Schock, 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). This conflation likely leads to a lack of interest amongst scholars that rigorously study violence.

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) moved the study of nonviolent resistance a large step forward when they created the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) data set, which looked at violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006. In their article, they used their data to test the argument that using nonviolence would lead to more success for a campaign than would the use of violence. Ultimately they find that in the face of state repression, a nonviolent campaign was more than six-times more likely to achieve full success than a violent campaign (2008, p. 21). They argue the success of nonviolence over violence is due to two primary reasons. First, nonviolence will result in greater domestic and international legitimacy, which in turn will encourage more participation, and subsequently will result in increased pressure on the target (2008, pp. 8–9). Second, state security forces are trained and equipped to respond to violence; when a state is faced with widespread nonviolence, it has more difficulty in appropriately responding (2008, p. 9). In an article by Celestino and Gleditsch (2013), the authors similarly seek to examine the efficacy of nonviolence. They find that nonviolent campaigns significantly increase transitions to democracies, whereas violent campaigns do not.

More generally, research looking at nonviolent resistance does not examine the efficacy of nonviolence, but rather seeks to understand the factors and determinants that impact the use of nonviolence or the behavior of groups that employ nonviolence as a tactic. Similar to research on violence, the factors examined can be broadly grouped by those originating either internal or

external to the group. Unfortunately for this particular effort, the role of network factors on nonviolence has yet to be examined, which if nothing else, suggests that there is significant room for scholarly work.

Explaining the Adoption of Violence or Nonviolence

Due to the rationality of the groups involved in this study, we should expect that groups will *learn* from the organizations to which they are connected. Organizational learning, which is "the development of new knowledge or insights that have the potential to influence behavior (Slater & Narver, 1995, p. 63)" is present in legal organizations, and can be expected to happen when considering violent or nonviolent groups opposing the government. Organizational learning has been used to mean multiple things over the years. In this application, organizational learning refers to the adoption of different tactics by groups. That is, a predominantly violent organization is learning if it begins to adopt nonviolent tactics; a predominantly nonviolent organization is learning if it begins to adopt violent tactics.

Although learning can occur in both violent and nonviolent groups, I expect that this organizational learning will be realized through *groups adopting nonviolent tactics*. Nonviolence, if effective, is the superior choice to violent tactics. As previously mentioned, nonviolent tactics are preferred to violent tactics for at least two reasons (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). First, nonviolence is met with greater legitimacy than is violence. Second, nonviolence is more difficult for the state security apparatus to respond to than is violence. Furthermore, we can surmise other reasons why nonviolent tactics are preferred to violent tactics. For one, the planning and execution of nonviolent tactics are less dangerous for the perpetrators than is

violence. It is also likely the case that nonviolence is cheaper than violence - the staging of a protest or march requires simply organization, whereas violent attacks require at minimum weapons and supplies. Due to this, we should expect to see the adoption of nonviolent tactics by groups that have used violence in the previous years.

Due to nonviolence being the preferred tactical choice, all else equal, we should expect that over time we can witness wholly or partially violent groups increasingly using nonviolence. This should particularly be the case when a group is connected to groups that use nonviolence. The connections are akin to an organizational field. Organizational fields are a community of organizations that provide similar services or products, and are subject to similar pressures (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). Additionally, the conception of organizational fields can be extended to include the network and configuration of relations, and the interaction of multiple, overlapping networks (Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005).

In turn, if we identify the level of tactical nonviolence within an organizational field, we can assess the impact of that nonviolence on the group in question. Thus, *organizations that are wholly or partially violent will increase their use of nonviolence the more that members of their organizational field employ nonviolence.*

The expectation of a group rationally choosing nonviolence, while plausible, runs somewhat contrary to the expectations the neoinstitutionalism, which would suggest that organizations will homogenize over time - not differentiate. Though organizational fields may display considerable diversity at the initial stages of their life cycles, through the establishment and structuration of the fields, and through the repeated interaction and reproduction of network relationships, homogenization occurs (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell et al., 2005).³

³ For an extensive overview of the literature on organizational fields, see Wooten and Hoffman (2008).

Groups that practice predominantly violent tactics should operate in a similar way to other violent groups. The same is true with nonviolent groups - groups that practice nonviolence should act like other nonviolent groups. The expectation of homogenization is due to isomorphic pressures. Isomorphism refers to a "constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149). Isomorphism has been theorized to occur for a number of reasons: (1) differentiation in the environment needs to be met with similar patterns of differentiation within the organization (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967); (2) competitive pressures in an industry lead to selecting out non-optimal organizational forms (Hannan & Freeman, 1977); (3) pressures in an organizational field (governmental, cultural, professional) placed on an organization to conform (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).⁴

There are three primary mechanisms of isomorphism, each of which would suggest that violent and nonviolent groups do not mix tactics. Coercive isomorphism refers to "formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150)." Laws, regulations, standard operating procedures, but also more subtle sources such as cultural and community influences, all contribute to the homogenization of organizations through coercive isomorphic pressures.

Mimetic isomorphism refers to the imitation of other organizations in uncertain environments. "When organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 151)." In conditions of high

⁴ See Carolan (2008) for an overview of theoretical approaches to isomorphism.

environmental uncertainty, where the relationship between the organizational means and ends is poorly understood, there are pressures to emulate structures and innovations that are expected to be met with higher levels of legitimacy. This is true even in situations where there is a lack of any empirical link between those structures and innovations, and the outputs to which they are related (Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009). Uncertainty can be defined as the inability of a organization's manager to "accurately assess the external environment of the organization or the future changes that might occur in the environment" (Dickson & Weaver, 1997, p. 405).

Organizations strive to minimize or eliminate uncertainty, because "certainty renders existence meaningful and confers confidence in how to behave and what to expect from the physical environment" (Hogg & Terry, 2000, p. 133).

Lastly, normative isomorphism results primarily from professionalization, which is interpreted "as the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work... (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152)." These normative pressures are due to the common education, training, and certifications processes of professionals by accredited professional bodies (Ashworth et al., 2009).

The three forms of isomorphism – coercive, mimetic, and normative – all work to condition and form organizations into similar patterns of structure and behavior. Coercive isomorphism refers to the informal expectations of how the group should look and act by the population and other groups (e.g. what should a violent group “look” like?). Mimetic isomorphism is expected in conditions of high environmental uncertainty – which is nearly always a pervasive conditions faced by groups opposing the government – especially violent groups. Normative isomorphism may not be an obvious application to the sort of groups in this study, however, there are numerous cases of shared training camps and contacts which are used

to educate, indoctrinate, and expand the skill sets of actors; these things are analogous to the professional associations and training programs of legal organizations.

Given the impacts that isomorphism should have on similar groups in similar environments, we can draw testable expectations. In a general way, each of the mechanisms of isomorphism have to do with environmental uncertainty. Groups in a given environment tend to homogenize because of uncertainty in how to act or behave, so through mimicking successful organizations and shared training, there's a better likelihood an organization will persist or be successful. *Levels of environmental uncertainty should condition the behavior of groups – in environments with high uncertainty, organizations will be more willing to mimic the tactics of other organizations in an effort to find stability in their own uncertainty. In low uncertainty environments, organizations will be more confident in their own strategies, and in turn we should see less tactical variation.*

Data and Methods

The existence of explicit connections between groups need not exist for these groups to be aware and learn from one another. Sharing common organizational fields is sufficient for the groups in this project to be aware of and learn from one another. The simple connections formed between groups which share an organizational field certainly falls short of the claims one can make about purposeful, significant connections such as alliances. However, these simple connections should be sufficient to realize the impacts of organizational learning or isomorphic pressures.

Furthermore, these connections can be modeled with great variation - whereas information on

group alliances is often sparse and needs to be assumed to exist in subsequent years, no such assumptions need to be made here.

The network created to model these relationships is based on data originally pulled from two datasets: the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2012) and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (Salehyan et al., 2012). Both of these datasets have data at the incident level. The range of data used for this study is limited to Africa, from 1990 to 2011. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) includes data on not just "terrorism", but on violence more generally, including some incidents more appropriately coded as guerrilla or insurgent activities. The Social Conflict in Africa Database includes data on both violent and nonviolent incidents.

Through the significant cleaning of data⁵, a dataset of 4,774 unique incidents - both violent and nonviolent - perpetrated by 218 unique groups, was developed. All incidents were coded as either violent or nonviolent. Further, a coding scheme of targets was established that was then applied to all data. With this incident level data, networks of relationships were then created for every year of the data.

The creation of group-year networks resulted in 924 connections over the timeframe of the study. The connections were created so that a minimal definition of an organizational field could be established. In turn, in order for there to be a connection between a group, two criteria needed to be met. The first was geographic proximity - a group needed to be present in the same country, or a contiguous country, for there to exist a relationship. Second, temporal proximity

⁵ Cleaning the data involved numerous steps. First, countries and years covered were aligned. Second, group identification and assignment was done – SCAD had 2,932 unique names, GTD had 540. Every named actor in both dataset was searched for to identify named groups. In SCAD, out of the 2,932 unique names, there were 174 named groups identified by 318 different actor descriptors. In GTD, out of the 540 unique names, there were 133 identifiable groups named with 145 different actor descriptors. Subsequently, years were constrained to 1990-1992, & 1994-2011. Lastly, groups with less than 1 incident and active only 1 year were excluded. Ultimately, these steps left me with a combined 218 groups and 4,774 observations across both datasets. These data were then used to create the networks of groups, which resulted in 924 observations.

was established as a weighted connection - connections were created when activity occurred within 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, and 18 months of the activity of another group. This in effect then created networks of organizational fields that comprised geographical proximity, as well as a variable measure of temporal proximity. With the networks these steps then created, we can create variables relating to the connections a group has, and use those variables in models to test whether or not organizations connected to nonviolent organizations are more likely to use nonviolent tactics.

The dependent variable measures the proportion of nonviolent tactics for a given group in a given year. This variable can range from 0, meaning the group is entirely violent, to 1, which means the group is entirely nonviolent. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most groups do not use a mixture of strategies - however, there is a sizeable minority which do use both violent and nonviolent tactics. Sixty percent of the groups in the study are wholly violent. Almost thirty-three percent of groups are wholly nonviolent. That means that roughly seven percent of the groups in the study use a mixture of both violent and nonviolent tactics.

The key independent variable relates to the levels of nonviolence among the connections shared by the group. Recall, the connections a group has are the other groups in the shared organizational field. In order to measure this, a variable which measures the proportion of nonviolence among network partners was created. Roughly forty-three percent of the organizational fields measured were wholly violent, whereas only nineteen percent were wholly nonviolent. We should expect that as the proportion of the organizational field utilizes nonviolent tactics, that the group in question should adopt nonviolent tactics as well.

Also important is the measure used to account for levels of uncertainty in the environment. This is accomplished by utilizing the measure of relative political extraction, from

the Relative Political Capacity Dataset (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al., 2012). Relative political extraction attempts to account for the efficiency of the government and mobilizing the state towards advancing public goals. I argue that this can serve to approximate the levels of uncertainty in an environment. States with high levels of capacity are more likely to have effective governing mechanisms and means of countering dissent. In turn, resistance groups in high-capacity states are more likely to have high levels of environmental uncertainty due to the state being more effective at countering them through the efforts of law enforcement or intelligence services. In states with low political capacity, it is more likely that resistance groups can operate more freely, or at least with more confidence in their actions. In order to utilize this variable, a dichotomous version of states with high political capacity (variable equal to 1) and states with low political capacity (variable equal to 0) was created, with the cut-off at the mean of all values.

Although not the explicit focus of this particular study, several variables were included to account for factors external and internal to the group. For factors external to the group, the state's population, gross domestic product, and whether or not a state was a democracy was included. These variables serve to mitigate some of the variability across the range of states in the study. Importantly, several variables were included to account for the various types of groups. However, rather than utilizing nonvariable or often unclear labels such as "ethnic-nationalist" or "religious" - group type is measured by focusing on which types of targets the group targeted. Thus, although a group may claim to be leftist or nationalist, by accounting for group types through the actions of the groups, we can avoid misinformation. The proportion of a group's total incidents that targeted citizens, the government, and security forces, are included as three separate variables.

Further variables include the number of groups in a focal group's network, or organizational field. Also, the number of incidents perpetrated by a given group in a given year is included. Lastly, and importantly, a dichotomous variable for whether or not a group was wholly nonviolent was included. This is important because we want to examine when groups adopt nonviolence - if a group is already using wholly nonviolent tactics, then it cannot adopt more nonviolence. Furthermore, this allows us to realize the effect of nonviolent neighbors only on those groups which use violent tactics in their repertoire.

Recall, the interest is in testing whether or not groups that are partially or wholly violent will adopt nonviolence as a tactic. However, we are also interested in seeing how environmental uncertainty, proxied by state capacity, impact the adoption of different tactics. In turn, two models are estimated using a cross sectional time series regression. Both models are shown in Table 1: in the first, state capacity is below the average capacity level; in the second, state capacity is at or above the average level of state capacity.

Discussion

As can be seen in Table 1, the proportion of nonviolence among a group's connection is a significant predictor of a group adopting nonviolence – yet only in states with high political capacity. This supports the arguments previously made. In states where there are high levels of state capacity, there will also be high levels of environmental uncertainty amongst groups. In these conditions, groups are searching for positive or stable examples of other groups which they can learn from and mimic. My initial argument was that groups would tend to prefer nonviolence over violence for various reasons. How the variables in this model were specified, a

Table 1: The Adoption of Nonviolent Tactics

	Low Environmental Uncertainty	High Environmental Uncertainty
Proportion of Nonviolence	0.023 (.025)	0.045** (.019)
Groups	-0.003 (.003)	0.003 (.003)
Population	-2.77E-10 (2.96E-10)	-4.17E-10 (2.53E-10)
Democracy	-0.020 (.023)	0.018 (.016)
GDP	2.18E-13 (2.17E-13)	3.49E-13*** (1.09e-13)
Incidents	0.001 (.001)	0.000 (.0004)
Target Civilians	-0.022 (.030)	-0.029 (.029)
Target Government	0.093*** (.028)	0.034 (.027)
Target Security	-0.02 (.033)	-0.056 (.037)
Wholly Nonviolent	0.904*** (.024)	0.876*** (.018)
Constant	0.026 (.028)	0.040 (.027)
Observations	236	359
Adjusted R^2	0.923	0.928
Standard Errors in Parentheses		
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$		

shift to violence would have also been captured. However, we can see that groups only shift *towards* nonviolence (not *from* it), and further, this only occurs in areas of high environmental uncertainty.

The other interesting finding is that groups which target the government are more likely to use nonviolence, but only in high-capacity states. These results run somewhat contradictory to what one might suspect – that it would be easier for violent groups to attack the government in

weak states. However, there is a shift towards nonviolent tactics in these situations. The intricacies of this particular point will be further explored as this project evolves.

As expected, groups that are wholly nonviolent account for a significant portion of nonviolent tactics. That is captured in the Wholly Nonviolent variable, and allows us to see the impacts the other variables have on violent groups.

Conclusions

This study demonstrates that there is value in studying both violence and nonviolence together. By looking at violent and nonviolent tactics together, we can gain a broader understanding of the tactical and strategic variations of groups. Nonviolence, if efficacious, is a desirable tactic to use - even if the group is violent. Violent groups which share organizational space - perhaps not explicit connections - but temporal and geographic proximity nonetheless, with nonviolent groups, become themselves more likely to use nonviolence. This is especially the case in strong states; where it is likely that the continued use of violence would prove difficult.

The impact of nonviolent connections was small, but this was expected. What I call group legacy refers to the actions, statements, beliefs, and interactions that have come to embody what it means to be that group. This is akin to organizational memory, which is described as the knowledge "codified or recorded in information systems, operation procedures, white papers, mission statements, organizational stories, or routines (Slater & Narver, 1995)." The reason why this is important is that this legacy - the tactical and strategic choices made historically by the group - suggests a path dependency for group strategic action. This would mean that groups will

rarely change their tactics - at least between the violent and nonviolent realms. In other words, violent groups can be expected to continue to use violence. This only contributes to the impact of the results shown - even violent groups will begin to use nonviolence when they have connections to nonviolent groups.

This study suffers from several limitations, which at minimum relate to the rigor of accounting for other factors that may impact the adoption of nonviolence. Better situating the groups in their local state environments is important, and though it was in part addressed here, it can be done better. Further, more work needs to be done to appropriately account for the factors internal to the group, such as group size. Last but not least, bolstering the networks of groups with evidence of explicit and purposeful ties would also be important - inclusion of allies and enemies, for example, could go a long way to explaining the adoption of tactics.

In this project, it was demonstrated that there is a relationship between the levels of violence and nonviolence in a group's organizational field, and how that impacts the group's tactical decisions. This is part of a larger effort to fully account for these tactical and strategic variations, and will be captured in concurrent and subsequent papers.

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